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Abstract 
Given the uncertainty and complexity of security risk analyses, there is a great need of tools 
for contextual inquiry supporting assessment of risk with multi-value scales according to 
different stakeholders’ point of view. Such tools can be used at individual level to help 
develop the understanding of a problem space. At the collective level, they can be used as a 
mean of communication to support the discussion, comparison and exploration of different 
understandings. The exploration of multiple perspectives of contextual understanding avoids 
entrapment in various types of reductionism and eliminates tendencies towards a deterministic 
reasoning and the pursuit of one optimum solution. A critical challenge is first developing a 
large spectrum of alternatives and then managing how the differences and similarities between 
alternatives will be handled to efficiently support decisions in information systems security 
(ISS). To address the aforementioned challenges, this paper seeks to explore the potential 
relevance of cognitive maps use in an ISS context to support the exploration of individual 
understanding leading to richer elaboration of problem spaces.  
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1. Introduction  
In information systems security (ISS), the objectives of the risk analysis process are 
to help to identify new threats and vulnerabilities, to estimate their business impact 
and to provide a dynamic set of tools to control the security level of the information 
system. In their practices, organisations employ and balance between prevention and 
response security management approaches (Baskerville et al., 2014). Many of the 
existing risk analysis models and frameworks focus mainly on the technical modules 
related to the development of security mitigation and prevention and do not pay 
much attention to the influence of contextual variables affecting the reliability of the 
provided solutions (Samela, 2008; Siponen and Willison, 2009). Moreover, Siponen 
and Iivari (2006) identified a gap in research on ISS policies when it comes to handle 
exceptional situations of business. The importance of context for systemic analysis 
has been widely recognized (e.g. Checkland, 1981; Checkland and Poulter, 2006; 
Ulrich, 1983). A systemic view of security would result in a better understanding of 
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organizational stakeholders of the role and application of security functions in 
situated practices and an achievement of contextually relevant risk analysis (Bednar 
and Katos, 2010). The study of Spears and Barki (2010) provides a particular 
application of this view in the context of regulatory compliance and confirms the 
conclusion that the engagement of users in ISS risk management process contributes 
to more effective security measures and better alignment of security controls with 
business objectives. 
Given the uncertainty and complexity of security risk analyses, there is a great need 
of tools for contextual inquiry supporting assessment of risk with multi-value scales 
according to different stakeholders’ point of view. Such tools can be used at 
individual level to help to develop the understanding of a problem space. At the 
collective level, they can be used as a mean of communication to support the 
discussion, comparison and exploration of different understandings. The exploration 
of multiple perspectives of contextual understanding avoids entrapment in various 
types of reductionism and eliminates tendencies towards a deterministic reasoning 
and the pursuit of one optimum solution. A critical challenge is first developing a 
large spectrum of alternatives and then managing how the differences and 
similarities between alternatives will be handled to efficiently support decisions in 
ISS. 
To address the aforementioned challenges, this paper seeks to explore the potential 
relevance of cognitive maps use in ISS context to support the exploration of 
individual understanding leading to richer elaboration of problem spaces. A case 
study is used to illustrate the concept. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the section 2, a short review 
of existing ISS models found in the literature is provided. Section 3 discusses the 
need for particular tools for contextual inquiry under uncertainty and complexity. In 
Section 4 a case study is given to illustrate the use of cognitive maps. Finally, the 
conclusive remarks are presented in section 5. 
2. Related literature 
A number of researchers have addressed the uncertainty and complexity related to 
ISS applying several theories as well as operations research techniques. The 
involvement of security experts has been a significant input in many of the models 
proposed. In Feng and Li (2011), an improved version of the evidence theory is used 
to deal with the uncertainty in ISS risk assessment. The proposed model requires 
experts’ beliefs inputs to establish the ISS index system and quantify index weights. 
However, the authors recognise the need to better elicit practitioners’ assessments of 
the strength of the evidence. In practice, the evaluation of risk under uncertainty 
through index weights appears to be highly structured reductionist and simplistic 
passing over the subjectivity inherent to any human problem solving process. It is 
also important to define relevant stakeholders in specific situation of risk analysis. In 
Ryan et al. (2012), the security expert judgment elicitation method is applied to 
quantify information security risks “where the experts’ weights are derived from the 
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experts’ responses to a set of seed variables whose values are known by the analyst 
and which are used to ‘‘calibrate’’ the accuracy of the experts’ opinions”. This 
method of codification is based on a list of a pre-determined questions and answers;  
however, in real world situations a problem space is not ‘given’ but created by the 
interest of relevant stakeholders who make use of their own norms and values, 
derived through experience, in the context of risk analysis. Moreover, it is limiting to 
disqualify out of context any understanding or analysis developed by any of the 
involved stakeholders or creates any kind of discrimination between them. All the 
contextual (and situated) perspectives should be considered as relevant. The concept 
of weight has also been used in Gupta et al. (2006) who propose a genetic algorithm 
approach to match security technologies to vulnerabilities. Without applying real 
case studies the techniques described in their approach, the authors argue that the 
estimation of weights depends on the types and preferences of the organization 
which will influence the decisions regarding the number of vulnerabilities covered 
and the cost of implemented security solutions.  
Based on the expert’s experience and a database of observed cases, Feng et al. 
(2014) develop a security risk analysis model using Bayesian network techniques 
and ant colony optimisation algorithms. The developed model identifies causal 
relationships of risk factors and vulnerability propagation analysis. In spite of the 
interest of the proposed model, it is difficult to apply it in practice to cope with 
unpredictable risks and more complex security risk analysis problems as the database 
of observed cases can only support the prediction of already know risks. It is also not 
apparent how to obtain the data to do so. The judgment of security risks cannot be 
only based on the security expert experience and knowledge, as the risk is 
contextually situated (Katos and Bednar, 2008).  
Another stream of research in ISS risk assessment draws up on the estimation of 
likelihood occurrences and impact of vulnerabilities and threats. Sommestad et al. 
(2010) provide an overview of several studies and methods based on probabilistic 
assessment of security incidents and their potential consequences. However, the 
discrete and non-linear nature of security failures limits the usefulness and relevance 
of an assessment based on probabilities (Brooke and Paige, 2003). Sun et al. (2006) 
propose to use the notion of plausibility of a negative outcome to measure ISS risk as 
it covers residual uncertainty. The authors suggest, for example, Delphi techniques to 
obtain consensus about values of evidence strength and recognise that the structure 
of their model is dependent on users’ understanding of the interrelationships between 
risk factors. However, as a consequence of subjectively known contextual 
dependencies, consensus about values of evidence is not necessarily achievable. 
We suggest therefore that two issues need to be further investigated in the field of 
ISS risk management. First, traditional probability theory is handicapped in the sense 
that it cannot capture and represent events in an uncertain domain. That is, 
probabilistic analysis requires that the probability distributions are known for all 
events. This limitation was initially addressed by Dempster (1967) and further 
refined by Shafer (1976). According to the Dempster Shafer mathematical theory of 
evidence (DST), classical probability is extended in such a way that events can be 
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described at a higher level of abstraction, without requiring one to resort to 
assumptions within the evidential set. Furthermore, Dempster and Shafer developed 
an algebraic system to combine events and produce measures for events that can be 
contradictory.  
Classic probability could be viewed as a special case of DST. In DST hypotheses are 
represented as subsets of a given set. A hypothesis is a statement which holds with 
some probability. An interesting feature in DST is that the probability assigned to a 
hypothesis need not be calculated or proven in the classic probability sense. 
Therefore, a probability can be a person's view on the validity of the respective 
hypothesis (Katos and Bednar, 2008). Second, the description of a problem space 
which is uncertain and complex requires the generation of multi-perspectives and 
mutually inconsistent possible alternatives. Unique perspectives of individual 
stakeholders may be particularly important in highlighting aspects of a problem 
situation which may have become ‘invisible’ due to over-familiarity (Bednar and 
Welch, 2006). At a collective level, it is important to recognise and consider each 
individual’s unique perspectives without temptation to unify or integrate the 
differences in a shared understanding of a problem space, to seek a premature 
consensus or to set up an artificial imposed scale of agreement.  
3. Use of cognitive maps for ISS risk analysis 
One manoeuvre for coping with uncertainty and unstructured situations involves 
sense-making and interpretation processes (Weick, 1995). To support such processes 
of reflection that assign meaning to data cognitive maps are constructed (Daft and 
Weick, 1984). A cognitive map (CM) consists of nodes and relations an individual 
uses to develop his/her understanding in specific problem space. When the relations 
are limited to causality effect cognitive map is the so-called cause map. The nodes 
are variables that may be continuous or dichotomous and can take on different values 
(Weick, 2001). Cognitive maps, as a model of thinking, may act as a tool to facilitate 
decision-making, problem-solving, and negotiation within the context of 
organizational intervention (Den, 1992).  
In the specific context of security risks, each breach provides the opportunity to 
develop understanding of risk in a way that incrementally allows the improvement of 
security practices. The development of understanding may not necessarily prevent 
the next breach but can support the learning about how to manage and respond to 
unpredictable risks. It is argued in this paper that the exploration and understanding 
of issues are not only conducted by technical experts in security but also by experts 
in context such as managers or end users engaged in a specific problem space. 
Furthermore, given that there are many cases in information security where 
exceptions need to be made due to the increased complexity of the problem; experts 
have to face contradicting opinions and problem descriptions. All complex problems 
suffer from this. For example, conceptual maps and rich pictures are used in Soft 
Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1981; Checkland and Poulter, 2006) to address 
complex problems and to support dialogue and conversation about problematic 
situations. As such, documenting the individual's view of a problem by the means of 
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cognitive maps may help in the development of more appropriate and flexible 
security policies and controls.  
As there is increased complexity and uncertainty, it is possible that each individual 
can make more than one description of potential problem issue due to more than one 
understanding of potential issue (Bednar, 2000; 2007) and so each individual could 
come up with more than one cognitive map. This would result in more sophisticated 
cognitive maps at an individual level. Still each individual would potentially end up 
having more than one cognitive map. The result would be that a group would 
potentially have more than three cognitive maps to discuss and compare. The 
following discussion and systematic analysis between individuals could focus on 
similarities and differences of understanding of individual cognitive maps. Some 
cognitive maps may be recognized by all individuals in a group as easy to understand 
but not necessarily to agree upon. Some cognitive maps may be recognized as not 
easy to understand in the same way but all participants and so should not be aligned 
with each other. Instead they should be developed and categorized further using 
heuristics. 
Such systematic analysis might support learning about threats and risk. And develop 
a number of additional and contextually relevant heuristics for continuity of inquiry - 
a kind of knowledge that the team through these conversations develop a better 
language for dialogue. It is learning about learning and heuristics which support this 
learning process. This help the team of professionals to get a better and more 
developed overview and insight into complexities of problem space and also their 
common and diverse understandings of the problem space they are interested in. 
In terms of security policies and controls, it may mean that there should not be a 
single policy that will cover the needs of all the involved stakeholders in the risk 
analysis process. As such, trying to force compliance with one policy (i.e. no 
exceptions) could lead to problematic security as people will be driven to circumvent 
the underlying security controls or to give up on their own professional best 
practices. 
4. Case study 
In this section we describe three CMs as produced by three stakeholders respectively 
following a security breach.  
ACME Ltd. like many other companies suffered a data breach. Following a 
preliminary assessment from the security expert, the company was exposed to an 
Advanced Persistent Threat, as it seemed that the attack was targeted and custom 
made to exploit the particular security gaps of the company. More specifically the 
external security expert – who was in fact commissioned to conduct an audit for the 
company a couple of years ago and had some good knowledge on the security 
posture of the company – was not surprised, as he had identified several 
vulnerabilities, most of which were not fully addressed. His view of the possible 
causes of the breach is captured with the CM as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Security expert’ CM  
However, the systems administrator had a different view of the cause of the attack 
vector. He did not agree with the security consultant, mainly because the latter had 
an outdated view of the infrastructure; two years ago the Bring Your Own Device 
(BYOD) paradigm was not as prevalent and the infrastructure has dramatically 
changed ever since.  
The network perimeter is completely different as many users bring their portable 
devices in their job environment bypassing most security controls: the firewall is not 
capable of inspecting and filtering all network traffic, documents and saved on 
smartphones and laptops in unencrypted forms, users are addicted to downloading a 
number of apps on the smartphones. As such the administrator is very upset with the 
plethora of functionality and applications he has no control of and his view of the 
problem stems from the adoption of BYOD where the company was unprepared to 
embrace. His CM is presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Systems administrator’ CM 
One of the end users feels somewhat responsible for the breach, as she recalled of 
two incidents that she did not considered being of significant importance.  
 
Figure 3: End user’ CM 
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The first incident was an email she received about 8 months ago appearing to be 
from the Finance Department asking her to complete an attached file with some 
personal information to receive a salary bonus. The attachment once opened cause 
her computer to crash and upon rebooting it the email was lost, so she thought that 
she misunderstood the whole content and context of the email. The second incident 
involved her losing a USB stick on her way home, about 6 months ago. The USB 
contained password protected documents, but the password was the same with the 
one she uses to log into the corporate system. She never reported the incident before, 
because she did use password protection on USB device, but after talking to the 
security expert, she realized that the password was perhaps weak and could have 
been recovered. Her view of the cause of the breach is captured in the CM in Figure 
3.  
For the above CMs the following assumptions can be made: 
 Each stakeholder assumes that his/her CM is correct and represents his/her 
true understanding of reality, 
 While the stakeholders might not agree with each other they all want to 
solve the problem, 
 All CMs could potentially be contextually relevant, more or less correct or 
wrong. 
The benefit of having multiple CMs supports the exploration of a wider problem 
space from multiple perspectives. This is particularly useful in the case where the 
attack vector is unknown.  
The involved stakeholders try to understand and compare through structured 
discussions the similarities and differences between their views of the problem space 
as described by their respective CMs. Each stakeholder can identify relationships 
between all of the CMs and categorize similarities and differences. The 
categorization can be made using an appropriate reasoning tool such as 
paraconsistent logic that allows ambiguity and uncertainty in judgement to be 
expressed. This can also be done by the application of methods such as the Diversity 
Network (e.g. Katos et al. 2006). As the three CM’s describe three potentially 
different and incompatible understandings of what ought to be a relevant attack 
vector to address, more than one security policy could be delivered. Furthermore 
more than one perspective allows the organization to better identify vulnerabilities 
and threats, and eventually implement more appropriate security controls and 
policies. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper explored security risk analysis as an example of an inquiry into a 
complex, ambiguous and uncertain problem space. As such the process needs to 
support stakeholders to develop a widening of problem understanding before 
stakeholders commit to a problem definition. This is done through developing 
multiple contextual understandings of information security risks by using CMs 
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which then are used by stakeholder in a dialogue for the discovery and description of 
relationships between the CMs as understood by each stakeholder. The objective 
with this effort is not to merge, integrate or combine different CMs as it might lead 
to framing stakeholders’ perspectives and views. Instead we argue that there must be 
recognition in the problem identification process that stakeholders may have 
different subjective and potentially valid problem experiences. We suggest the 
consideration of multiple security policies to reflect the differing CMs of experts, 
managers and users. We recognise that there is a limit to how many CMs will be 
used in practice. Then a relevant question for future research would be how to 
determine and incorporate the chosen CMs.  
This work would benefit from further developing of how frameworks such as 
Strategic Systemic Thinking (e.g. Bednar, 2000) and methods such as diversity 
networks could be applied in the identification process of similarities and differences 
between multiple CMs. It would also aid in the decision making processes among the 
involved stakeholders. 
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